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The authors reanalyzed data from 2 influential studies—A. R. McConnell and J. M. Leibold (2001) and
J. C. Ziegert and P. J. Hanges (2005)—that explore links between implicit bias and discriminatory
behavior and that have been invoked to support strong claims about the predictive validity of the Implicit
Association Test. In both of these studies, the inclusion of race Implicit Association Test scores in
regression models reduced prediction errors by only tiny amounts, and Implicit Association Test scores
did not permit prediction of individual-level behaviors. Furthermore, the results were not robust when the
impact of rater reliability, statistical specifications, and/or outliers were taken into account, and reanalysis
of A. R. McConnell & J. M. Leibold (2001) revealed a pattern of behavior consistent with a pro-Black
behavioral bias, rather than the anti-Black bias suggested in the original study.
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The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee &
Schwartz, 1998) has become one of psychology’s most popular
exports to the wider social sciences and the law (e.g., Lane, Kang,
& Banaji, 2007). The measure’s popularity is easy to grasp: IAT
researchers often inform test takers they harbor implicit or uncon-
scious biases toward minorities that many test takers disavow at a
conscious level (Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003). Accord-
ing to the much-visited Project Implicit Web site, without constant
vigilance these implicit biases may lead to unwanted behaviors:
People who hold egalitarian conscious attitudes in the face of auto-
matic White preferences may [be] able to function in nonprejudiced
fashion partly by making active efforts to prevent their automatic
White preference from producing discriminatory behavior. However,
when they relax these active efforts, these nonprejudiced people may
be likely to show discrimination in thought or behavior. (IAT Corpo-
ration, n.d., Question 16)
It is this claimed connection between implicit attitudes and
discrimination that can make IAT feedback particularly disturbing
to test takers. It also is the feature that makes research on the IAT
of broad interdisciplinary interest. If the race IAT reliably predicts
discriminatory behavior that cannot be consciously controlled,
then society should take note. As but one example, the great
majority of White Americans who have taken the IAT have been
classified as anti-Black. This then points to an epidemic, either of
unconscious racism (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006) or of false-
positive accusations of unconscious racism (Mitchell & Tetlock,
2006).
Given the importance of the link between IAT scores and
behavior, one might expect to find a large body of data establishing
this connection—indeed, Greenwald and Krieger (2006, p. 961)
described the evidence that implicit bias leads to discriminatory
behavior as “already substantial.” In fact, researchers in only a few
studies have examined the ability of the IAT to predict behavior of
any type, and researchers in just over a dozen published studies
have examined the ability of the race IAT to predict outcomes that
might be indicative of inappropriate or discriminatory behaviors
(see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, in press; Ziegert
& Hanges, 2005). Yet the perception exists that the relationship
between IAT scores and behavior has been much studied and well
established. For instance, one prominent legal scholar, writing in
the legal academy’s preeminent law review, described the rela-
tionship as clear and strong:
There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social
category, as measured by instruments such as the IAT, predicts
disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category. This
occurs notwithstanding contrary explicit commitments in favor of
racial equality. In other words, even if our sincere self-reports of bias
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score zero, we would still engage in disparate treatment of individuals
on the basis of race, consistent with our racial schemas. Controlled,
deliberative, rational processes are not the only forces guiding our
behavior. That we are not even aware of, much less intending, such
race-contingent behavior does not magically erase the harm. (Kang,
2005, p. 1514)
This perception is reinforced in the popular-science bestseller,
Blink, which describes the IAT as “more than just an abstract
measure of attitudes. It’s also a powerful predictor of how we act
in certain kinds of spontaneous situations” (Gladwell, 2005, p. 85).
In this article, we closely scrutinize claims that the race IAT
predicts discriminatory behavior—and discover that the evidence
is surprisingly weak.
Background
High Stakes and Strong Claims
Almost a half century ago, Congress passed the landmark Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the act forbade consideration of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment deci-
sions, with the goal of promoting equal employment opportunity
and the expectation that socioeconomic gains for the newly pro-
tected groups would follow, albeit with delays due to historical
disadvantages of these groups (Fiss, 1974). Forty-five years later,
controversy persists over how much progress America has made.
Optimists point to dramatic positive changes in public opinion and
to market gains by women and minorities within this time period:
The percentages of Americans who endorse overt prejudice senti-
ments has plummeted (Quillian, 2006), and wages for women and
African Americans have grown substantially (Bodvarsson, 2001;
Juhn & Potter, 2006). Pessimists point out that wages for Blacks in
particular stagnated in the 1980s (Bodvarsson, 2001; O’Neill,
1990) and that large differences in socioeconomic outcomes per-
sist, such as with respect to incarceration rates, educational
achievement, and health outcomes (Franks, Muennig, Lubetkin, &
Jia, 2006; Lucas & Paret, 2005; Western & Pettit, 2005). These
stubborn disparities challenge the depth and sincerity of the new-
found public support of racial equality in principle—and have led
some social scientists to argue that prejudice has merely assumed
more subtle but equally toxic forms (see Dovidio, 2001; Kang &
Banaji, 2006; Quillian, 2006; Rudman, 2004).
Placed in this historical context, it becomes clear why few
psychological debates have higher policy stakes than those over
the pervasiveness and potency of implicit prejudice: There is a
direct logical—and legal—link between assessments of the linger-
ing power of prejudice and assessments of how much society in
general, and organizations in particular, should do to ensure equal-
ity of opportunity in workplaces. If, as Kang and Banaji (2006)
argued, implicit prejudice biases the judgments of 75% or more of
Americans and leads to discriminatory treatment at either the level
of nonverbal behavior or overt personnel actions, then it is impor-
tant to reexamine the types of policies and procedures organiza-
tions need to block the influence of this newly discovered form of
prejudice. Such reexamination could lead judges to look at evi-
dence in litigation differently, lead regulators to reform their
best-practice recommendations, and lead legislators to reconsider
the role of intentionality in antidiscrimination law. In short, if the
claims being made for the pervasiveness and behavioral impact of
implicit prejudice are correct, then wholesale changes to American
law and American ways of doing business may be in order (see
Blasi & Jost, 2006; Jolls & Sunstein, 2006).
Strong claims, however, require strong evidence—and this is all
the more so when there are political and legal temptations to
exaggerate or trivialize what researchers uncover combined with
public commitments to particular viewpoints (e.g., Lodge & Taber,
2005; Munro, Leary, & Lasane, 2004; Tetlock, 2005). Not sur-
prisingly, disputes have erupted in both psychological and legal
journals over both the validity of unconscious-prejudice measures
and the applicability of unconscious-prejudice research to real-
world controversies (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Bagenstos,
2007; Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2004; Blanton & Jaccard,
2006; Greenwald, Rudman, Nosek, & Zayas, 2006; Mitchell &
Tetlock, 2006). The debates involve a wide range of issues, in-
cluding (a) construct-validity questions about what exactly implicit
measures measure; (b) criterion-variable questions about the de-
gree to which correlations between implicit measures of prejudice
and outcome variables should count as support for a
pervasiveness-of-prejudice interpretation or alternative more be-
nign explanations; and (c) external-validity questions about the
degree to which lab demonstrations of the alleged predictive power
of measures of implicit bias will hold up in work settings in which
decision makers work under accountability constraints, have in-
centives to assemble productive teams, and have access to large
amounts of individuating information.
In this article, we shed light on two key debates within the
implicit bias literature: (a) Does the race IAT reliably predict
discriminatory behavior and (b) do published reports support the
claim that the majority of people in the general public possess a
level of bias likely to produce discriminatory behavior? Defenders
of the IAT often point to studies of correlations between IAT
scores and various behavioral criterion variables. They suggest
these correlations validate the use of the IAT as a measure of
implicit attitudes and stereotypes (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, &
Sriram, 2006) and prove its utility in predicting behavior (e.g.,
Greenwald & Krieger, 2006). We have argued elsewhere, how-
ever, that any purported linkage between implicit prejudice and
discriminatory behavior found in these studies is weak and unsta-
ble, because it depends on measures of dubious reliability and
validity and perhaps a small number of outlier respondents (Mitch-
ell & Tetlock, 2006). Further, we have argued that researchers
have not pursued the types of analyses that permit them to draw
inferences about the prevalence of implicit biases (Blanton &
Jaccard, 2006, 2008). The current project speaks to both of these
issues.
We do not focus on the basic construct-validity question of what
the IAT measures because we think scores on current forms of the
IAT are confounded by too many influences to support a unified
theoretical account. For instance, Uhlmann, Brescoll, and Paluck
(2006) found that the IAT response patterns typically interpreted
as reflective of antipathy toward Blacks may reflect sympathy for
them. Rothermund and Wentura (2004; Rothermund, Wentura, &
De Houwer, 2005) linked this same response pattern to differential
familiarity with test stimuli. Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, and Hart
(2004) linked this pattern to respondents’ fears of appearing racist
(see also Vanman, Saltz, Nathan, & Warren, 2004, who found
greater bias on the IAT among those with a higher motivation to
control prejudice). Various nonattitudinal cognitive skills also
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influence IAT scores, with less cognitively proficient test takers
typically appearing more implicitly racist (Blanton, Jaccard,
Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; Hummert, Garstka, O’Brien, Green-
wald, & Mellott, 2002; McFarland & Crouch, 2001; Mierke &
Klauer, 2003). Accordingly, we adopt an applied perspective and
focus on what we take to be both a more pressing and tractable
question about IAT research: To what degree does alleged anti-
Black bias on the IAT translate into a propensity to discriminate?
Data Analytic Considerations
Our initial goal was to obtain data from all published studies
examining the IAT’s power to predict workplace discrimination in
actual or simulated environments. Surprisingly, however, we
found only two studies reasonably precisely fitting this descrip-
tion—Rudman and Glick (2001), who reported their data as lost,
and Ziegert and Hanges (2005), who shared their data but could
not provide the raw IAT data necessary for applying standard
scoring algorithms and testing underlying psychometric assump-
tions (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). Accordingly, we expanded our
project to encompass data from published studies that figure prom-
inently in applications of IAT research to the law. In particular, we
requested data from the specific studies cited by Kang and Banaji
(2006)—in a special issue of the California Law Review devoted to
implicit bias—to argue that the IAT predicts discriminatory be-
havior. We thus added Green et al. (2007; a study that focused on
medical decision making and that was based on a data set that
arrived too late for inclusion) and McConnell and Leibold (2001;
a study that focused on the power of the IAT to predict interper-
sonal behavior and that was based on a data set that did arrive in
time for inclusion). Because we again found the scope of relevant
studies surprisingly small, we expanded our data requests to in-
clude studies methodologically similar to McConnell and Liebold
(2001) and thus of potential relevance to racial bias in interviews,
including Heider and Skowronski (2007), Richeson and Shelton
(2005), and Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Trawalter (2005), as
well as to include Rudman and Ashmore (2007), which examines
the relation of race IAT scores to overt acts of discrimination. We
obtained only the Heider and Skowronski (2007) data from this
final search (but again only after the editorial process was well
underway and too late for inclusion in this study). Table 1 sum-
marizes the data requests we made for this project and the results
of these requests.1
The reliance on data from a small set of studies should give one
pause about embracing strong claims about the predictive validity
of the race IAT. Ideally, we would have performed identical
statistical tests on all of the published reports and presented our
summary results. It would have been valuable, for instance, to
apply modern robust statistical procedures to all of the published
data sets (Wilcox, 2005). Since researchers commonly claim that
the published record indicates that the majority of people have
implicit biases that can influence their behavior in negative ways
(e.g., Greenwald & Krieger, 2006; Kang & Banaji, 2006), a
summary statement about the role that statistical outliers plays in
this research area would have told us whether effects being attrib-
uted to most of us are being driven by a few extreme individuals.
Although we did explore robust statistical analyses in two separate
studies, we cannot know whether the results from these studies
represent the influence of outliers across all IAT–behavior studies
because of our difficulty in obtaining other data sets for replica-
tion.
Nevertheless, there is substantial value in critically examining
the data sets we did obtain. Data from McConnell and Leibold
(2001) and Ziegert and Hanges (2005) play important roles in
ongoing debates about the behavioral consequences of implicit
biases, with the McConnell and Leibold study being particularly
prominent. As noted above, Kang and Banaji (2006) cited these
studies to lay a foundation for their claim that antidiscrimination
law must be remade to address implicit biases, and they noted that
McConnell and Leibold was “the first study to demonstrate rela-
tions among the IAT, intergroup discrimination, and explicit mea-
sures of prejudice” (p. 440). Furthermore, McConnell and Leibold
is cited more often than any other study for which we requested
data and appears to be the most-cited study on the IAT–behavior
linkage (McConnell and Leibold has been cited over 150 times in
the PsycINFO database). Ziegert and Hanges is an important study
as well because, also as noted above, it is one of only two
published studies examining the power of implicit measures to
predict judgments in an applied context that is potentially related
to discriminatory treatment, albeit in a simulated employment
setting. Moreover, Ziegert and Hanges has already made its way
into the legal and organizational behavior literatures as evidence
that the implicit biases influence employment outcomes (e.g.,
Duehr & Bono, 2006; Haines & Sumner, 2006; Katz, 2006).
It is reasonable to ask what can be gained from data reanalysis
that cannot be obtained from more traditional approaches to study-
ing the robustness of effects, namely, meta-analysis or a qualitative
review emphasizing methodological strengths and weaknesses of
different studies. We conducted three key inquiries that required
the underlying data and thus could not be done through qualitative
or meta-analytic reviews. First, we formally explored the role of
outliers on conclusions using modern-day robust methods of anal-
ysis (Wilcox, 2005). Second, we examined the effect of aggrega-
tion and data transformations on the reported trends in the data.
Third, we examined the functional form of the relationship be-
tween individual IAT scores and individual behaviors and the
incremental predictive validity provided by the IAT.
1 Greenwald et al. (in press) identified 12 published articles involving
some version of the race IAT and discriminatory behavior broadly defined,
including indicators of brain activity on observing racial stimuli. Our
requests included a number of the studies included in the Greenwald et al.
(in press) meta-analysis as well as studies that would seem to fall within the
scope of the meta-analysis but were omitted (Heider & Skowronski, 2007;
Richeson & Shelton, 2005; Shelton et al., 2005; Ziegert & Hanges, 2005).
Had we been able to obtain all of the data initially sought, then we would
have attempted to include in this project data from all of the published
studies involving behavioral and judgment criterion variables identified by
Greenwald et al. (in press), although not the studies using neurological
indicators as criterion variables because such studies do not directly ad-
dress the linkage between IAT scores and behavior or judgments. None-
theless, our findings still qualify the conclusions reached in Greenwald et
al. (in press), which omitted seemingly relevant studies and took the
reported results of McConnell and Leibold (2001) at face value. We
continue to seek data for use in what we hope will be a more comprehen-
sive future analysis, and, as noted in the text, we recently obtained two
additional data sets for inclusion in a follow-up project.
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Reanalysis of the McConnell and Leibold (2001) Study
Description of the Study
Overview. McConnell and Leibold (2001) examined whether
explicit and implicit measures of racial bias predicted racially
discriminatory behavior, with discrimination defined as less
friendly interactions by White participants to Black versus White
experimenters. They reported that scores on the race IAT “related
to biases in intergroup social interactions” (p. 440). This relation-
ship was evident based on ratings of the interactions by “objective”
judges who watched videotapes of the interactions and by the
experimenters who participated in the participant–experimenter
interactions.2 We focus here on the results found in McConnell and
Leibold using the judges’ ratings of interactions, because these are
not filtered by the experience of actually participating in the
interactions, are richer in the number and types of behaviors rated,
and presumably provide a direct comparison of the relative treat-
ment by participants of persons of different races.
Procedure. Forty-one White college undergraduates partic-
ipated in McConnell and Leibold’s (2001) study, which was
described as an experiment on word perception involving
four unrelated tasks. All interactions between participants and
experimenters were secretly recorded for later coding by
observers.3
In the first task, a White female experimenter asked participants
four scripted questions and told a scripted joke. This interaction
lasted about 3 min. Next, participants completed a booklet of
questionnaires, which included the explicit measures of prejudice.
The experimenter stressed to participants to answer honestly and
that their responses were private.
When participants completed the booklet, the White experi-
menter took the participant to a word experiment, where the
participant completed the race IAT. Just before the participant
started the IAT task, the experimenter looked at the clock and said
her shift was over and that a new experimenter would take over
after the word experiment. While participants completed the IAT,
a Black female experimenter replaced the White experimenter and
greeted participants at the completion of the IAT. The Black
experimenter asked each participant seven scripted questions about
the experiment, pausing for the participant’s answers between each
question and recording the responses on an interview form and told
a scripted joke after the fourth question. McConnell and Leibold
(2001) did not report the elapsed time for this final interaction.4
They scored the IAT using the original algorithm (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), with larger positive scores indicating
greater negativity toward Blacks than Whites.
2 The finding with respect to experimenter ratings of interracial interac-
tions, at least as reported by McConnell and Leibold (2001), is contrary to
the finding of Shelton et al. (2005), where Black experimenters reported
more favorable interactions with participants who showed greater anti-
Black bias on the IAT.
3 Forty-two persons participated initially, but 1 participant refused to
allow the videotape of her interactions with experimenters to be used in the
study. The text of the article suggests that both men and women partici-
pated in the study, but there was no breakdown of participants by sex nor
was a test for sex differences reported.
4 As Chugh (2004) noted, the second interaction differed significantly
from the first interaction: Whereas the first interaction raised no racial
issues, the second interaction involved a Black experimenter explicitly
asking White participants race-related questions after the participants had
completed the race IAT. Chugh incorrectly stated, however, that judges in
McConnell and Leibold (2001) were blind to the race of the experimenter;
in fact, McConnell and Leibold’s procedure section makes clear that judges
viewed both the participant and experimenter. McConnell and Leibold
acknowledged that the order of tasks may have sensitized participants to
racial attitudes and led to discomfort on the part of some participants.
Furthermore, in the second interaction the experimenter asked three addi-
tional scripted questions, which may have impacted the quality of the
interaction and certainly altered the opportunity for the expression of a
number of the behaviors that the judges coded from the interactions (e.g.,
number of smiles and speech errors).
Table 1
Requests for Data on IAT–Behavior Correlations
Study Topic Status
Green et al. (2007) Prediction of biased medical decisions by race IAT Provided data during editorial process
Heider & Skowronski (2007) Prediction of subtle discrimination in interpersonal
interactions by race IAT; prediction of biased behavior in
Prisoner’s Dilemma game by race IAT
Provided data during editorial process
McConnell & Leibold (2001) Prediction of subtle discrimination in interpersonal
interactions by race IAT
Provided data
Richeson & Shelton (2005) Prediction of subtle discrimination in interpersonal
interactions by race IAT
In continuing discussions to try to obtain data
Rudman & Glick (2001) Prediction of biased ratings of hypothetical job candidates
by gender IAT
Data unavailable
Rudman & Ashmore (2007) Prediction of self-reported acts of discrimination and support
for cuts to different student groups by IATs
Data unavailable
Shelton et al. (2005) Prediction of subtle discrimination in interpersonal
interactions by race IAT
Data unavailable
Ziegert & Hanges (2005) Prediction of biased ratings of hypothetical job candidates
by race IAT
Provided transformed IAT data and all other
data; original raw IAT data unavailable
Note. IAT  Implicit Association Test.
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Two male judges viewed the videotapes of participant–
experimenter interactions and rated (on 9-point scales) each
participant’s interaction with the White and Black experiment-
ers with respect to the participant’s friendliness during the
interaction, the abruptness or curtness of the participant’s re-
sponses to questions, the participant’s general comfort level,
how much the participant laughed at the experimenter’s joke,
and the amount of participant’s eye contact with the experi-
menter. On 5-point scales, judges rated the participant’s for-
ward body lean toward the experimenter (vs. leaning away), the
extent to which the participant’s body faced the experimenter
(vs. facing away), the openness of the participant’s arms (vs.
crossed arms), and the expressiveness of the participant’s arms
(vs. not moving at all). Judges also estimated the distance
between the experimenter and the participant’s chair at the end
of the interaction to gauge social distance and recorded the
participant’s speaking time and the participant’s number of
smiles, speech errors, speech hesitations, fidgeting body move-
ments, and extemporaneous social comments.
McConnell and Leibold (2001) used individual-level differ-
ence scores to define prejudice and discrimination. For exam-
ple, they defined discriminatory behavior as the difference
between a score representing some dimension of the interaction
with the White experimenter minus a score characterizing the
same dimension for the interaction with the Black experi-
menter. A score of zero reflected identical ratings of the par-
ticipant’s interactions with the White and Black experimenters.
Higher scores ostensibly indicated more favorable behavior
toward Whites than Blacks. This difference-score approach was
adopted for almost all analyses. We show later how this ap-
proach masked important trends in the data and how transfor-
mations applied to these difference scores created additional
confusion.
Results. McConnell and Leibold (2001) treated the judges’
ratings of each participant’s interactions with each experi-
menter on the dimensions of friendliness, abruptness, and com-
fort level as a molar judgment of interaction quality because
ratings on these dimensions were supposed to capture overall
interaction quality. These three ratings were averaged (once for
the interaction with the White experimenter and once for the
interaction with the Black experimenter), creating two molar
scores, and these two scores were then standardized. Difference
scores were calculated for each of these dimensions, such that
more positive values reflected more positive behavior toward
the White experimenter. These three mean standardized differ-
ence scores were then summed to create a single molar rating of
relative interaction quality for each participant. Although the
sum of the three behaviors (when scored in the same direction)
yielded a statistically significant correlation with the IAT, none
of the individual items forming the molar rating index did so.
Overall, of the 16 behaviors rated by the two judges, only 5
correlated significantly with IAT scores (see Table 2). McCo-
nnell and Leibold treated the three target molar judgments of
behavior as sufficiently correlated to justify aggregating them
and focused their conclusions on the sum of the three molar
behaviors. Accordingly, it is these molar judgments about in-
teractions that we focus on in our reanalysis.
Methodological Comments
Before turning to the reanalysis, we comment on two method-
ological limitations of the study, one pertaining to the timing of
assessments and another pertaining to the training of the judges.
Timing of measures. As noted, participants completed explicit
racism measures and the race IAT after interacting with the White
experimenter but before interacting with the Black experimenter.
Completion of these measures likely caused some participants to
suspect they were participating in a study on discrimination. Con-
sider that the explicit measures asked individuals to report how
“pleasant” and “ugly” they find Black people, among other things.
Participants were then presented with a 10-min task in the form of
the IAT that linked stereotypical Black names (e.g., Jamal and
Yolanda) and White names (e.g., Fred and Mary Ann) to positive
and negative words. These experiences may have made partici-
pants feel nervous about appearing racist, particularly if they
thought they had scored badly on the IAT (see Frantz et al., 2004).
Because the experience of failing the IAT may cause people to act
nervously around Black experimenters (as reflected by speech
hesitations, speech errors, etc.), the IAT score–behavior correla-
tion may reflect a method artifact rather than the influence of
preexisting implicit attitudes on behavior.5
Low interjudge reliability. Charter (2003) reported a median
interjudge reliability coefficient of .90 across a wide range of
studies and recommended .70 as a minimal acceptable correlation
between judges’ ratings. Low interjudge reliability makes it diffi-
5 This same artifact was present in Richeson and Shelton (2005) and
Shelton et al. (2005), both of which administered the race IAT before
participants had key interactions with Black people. Ideally, order of
presentation of the attitude measures and order of interaction with the
White versus Black experimenter would be counterbalanced and any order
effects examined.
Table 2
Correlations Between Implicit Association Test Scores and
Judges’ Ratings of Interaction Behaviors in McConnell
and Leibold (2001)
Judges’ rating r
Molar behaviors
Judge rating of friendliness .27
Judge rating of curtness or abruptness .27
Judge rating of general comfort level .26
Other behaviors
Judge rating of forward leaning .26
Judge rating of facing experimenter .03
Judge rating of body openness .17
Judge rating of expressiveness .09
Judge rating of eye contact .25
Judge rating of seating distance .26
Judge rating of speaking time .51
Judge rating of smiling .39
Judge rating of speech errors .42
Judge rating of speech hesitation .35
Judge rating of fidgeting .06
Judge rating of laughter at joke .19
Judge rating of social comments .32
 p  .05.
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cult to determine whether observed differences reflect true differ-
ences among the participants or simply differences among the
judges (see, e.g., Lunz, Stahl, & Wright, 1994).
McConnell and Leibold (2001) reported interjudge reliability
coefficients of .48, .43, and .53 for the three items in the molar
rating (they characterized these levels of agreement as good; p.
439), and only four of the reliability coefficients for the other 13
behaviors rated by the judges exceeded .65 (see Table 3 in their
study). Such low interjudge reliability suggests that the judges
were not given adequate training or guidance on how to code target
behaviors or that the judges were subject to differential expectancy
effects or motivational influences. In McConnell and Leibold, the
judges knew the race of both the participant and experimenter
when making ratings (contrast this procedure with that in Richeson
& Shelton, 2005, where raters viewed only the target and were
blind to the race of the other interacting party), and many of the
ratings that the judges were asked to make explicitly drew atten-
tion to both the participant and the experimenter. Thus, it is
possible that a judge’s idiosyncratic expectations about White–
Black interactions or a judge’s own prejudices introduced system-
atic bias into the ratings, biases that were not sufficiently elimi-
nated when McConnell and Leibold aggregated across judges. In
any event, the low interjudge reliabilities in McConnell and Lei-
bold suggest substantial differences in perceptions of the
participant–experimenter interactions and bring into question the
propriety of aggregating the two judges’ ratings.
Reanalysis 1: The IAT–Behavior Correlation as a
Function of a Single Judge’s Ratings on a Subset
of the Behaviors
We noted above that one of McConnell and Leibold’s (2001)
main findings was a statistically significant correlation between
participants’ IAT scores and judges’ aggregated molar ratings of
the overall interaction quality between White participants and
White versus Black experimenters. Because the interaction quality
variable was composed of two distinct ratings (molar ratings of the
quality of the interaction with the White experimenter and molar
ratings of the quality of the interaction with the Black experi-
menter), the significant IAT–molar correlation may have been
driven by the treatment of the White experimenter, the treatment of
the Black experimenter, both, or neither. Also, because molar
ratings were made with two distinct judges who disagreed often in
their ratings, the correlation between IAT scores and molar ratings
may reflect different judgment contexts rather than differences
driven by implicit attitudes. At a minimum, substantively different
patterns across the two judges would indicate that the results are
more fragile or conditional than McConnell and Leibold’s aggre-
gated results suggest.
Table 3 presents the IAT–behavior correlation as a function of
judge and race of the experimenter. Whereas the molar ratings by
Judge 2 correlated statistically significantly with IAT scores (r 
.38, p  .05), those of Judge 1 did not (r  .19). Further, the molar
ratings for Judge 2 correlated with IAT scores primarily due to
how this judge assessed participants’ interactions with the White
experimenter compared to the Black experimenter, but neither
correlation was statistically significant by traditional standards
(r  –.27 vs. r  .10).6 It is noteworthy, also, that the IAT–
behavior correlation depended more on behavior toward the White
experimenter than the Black experimenter. These results suggest
that the significant correlation of IAT scores and molar ratings is
attributable to the idiosyncratic reactions of one judge.7
Reanalysis 2: The IAT–Molar Rating Correlation Is
Sensitive to Outlier Effects
We noted earlier that past studies have found that individuals
with slower processing speed (e.g., older individuals, persons with
low IQ) tend to be diagnosed on the IAT as more implicitly biased
than those who respond more quickly, even though they are not
necessarily more biased (see Hummert et al., 2002; McFarland &
Crouch, 2001). In recognition of this problem, in 2003 the creators
of the IAT introduced a new system for scoring the IAT that
allegedly corrects for the processing confound (but see Blanton &
Jaccard, 2006, 2008). Because McConnell and Leibold published
in 2001, they used the original method for scoring the IAT and thus
did not remove this potential source of method variance from IAT
scores before conducting statistical tests.
However, participants in McConnell and Leibold (2001) did
report their age, making it possible to test for the influence of at
least this documented contaminant of IAT scores (Hummert et al.,
2002). Analysis of the age distribution of participants revealed 1
participant whose age placed her more than five standard devia-
tions above the mean age of study participants (participant age of
50 compared to modal and mean ages of approximately 19).
Consistent with the finding that IAT scores increase with age, this
older participant’s IAT score was 2.5 standard deviations above
the mean IAT score for the sample. When this participant was
excluded from the data analysis, the correlation between IAT
scores and judges’ molar ratings of participants’ interactions with
experimenters fell from significance (r  .32, p  .05) to nonsig-
6 When the IAT was regressed on the two judges’ ratings in the two
conditions (White and Black experimenter), the multiple R was significant
(r  .41, p  .03). However, when the ratings of Judge 2 from the White
experimenter condition were dropped, the multiple R became nonsignifi-
cant (r  .20, p  .65). This finding is consistent with the proposition that
the race IAT–behavior correlation is primarily due to the behavioral ratings
of Judge 2 for the White experimenter.
7 If the sample size in the McConnell and Leibold (2001) study (N  41)
were larger, one could test whether an observed correlation for the one
judge differs significantly from the corresponding observed correlation for
the other judge.
Table 3
Correlation of Molar Score With Implicit Association Test Score
From McConnell and Leibold (2001)
Judges’ score r p
Judge 1
White minus Black .19 .24
White experimenter –.06 .72
Black experimenter .14 .38
Judge 2
White minus Black .38 .02
White experimenter –.27 .09
Black experimenter .10 .54
 p  .05.
572 BLANTON ET AL.
nificance (r  .24, p  .13).8 This drop in statistical significance
is not attributable to a loss of statistical power (because only one
degree of freedom was lost by excluding the individual). Figure 1
presents a scatter plot of IAT scores and judges’ aggregate molar
ratings. Note that 2 participants anchor the lower and upper quad-
rants of the scatter plot, with the bulk of the cases in between
showing no discernable linear relation between the constructs in
question. Examination of the correlation between IAT scores and
molar ratings using the percentage bend correlation, an outlier
resistant correlation index (Wilcox, 2005), revealed that the orig-
inal correlation was dependent on outliers (rpb  .24, p  .13).
Reanalysis 3: The IAT Data Suggest a Pro-White Bias
But the Behavioral Data Suggest a Pro-Black Bias
Ninety percent (37 of 41) of McConnell and Leibold’s (2001)
participants had positive IAT scores (the IAT is traditionally coded
such that positive scores reflect relatively slower reaction times
when African American stimuli are paired with positive words
and/or when European American stimuli are paired with negative
words; Greenwald et al., 1998). If 90% of respondents are “biased”
against Blacks and the IAT metric is not arbitrary (see Blanton &
Jaccard, 2006), one would expect a large proportion of the sample
to discriminate against the Black experimenter. But that was not
the case. In fact, over 70% of the sample acted more positively
toward the Black experimenter.
This trend in the data was not apparent in McConnell and
Leibold’s (2001) reporting of results due to a data transformation
and the reporting of results using only this transformed data. As
noted above, McConnell and Leibold defined discrimination as the
difference in molar ratings of interactions with the White versus
the Black experimenter. Thus, more positive scores would indicate
more positive interactions with the White experimenter, and the
sample mean difference score on the molar judgment variable
should be positive. However, because McConnell and Leibold
standardized the two separate molar ratings for each interaction,
each separate molar rating had a mean of zero and the mean of the
summed molar ratings approximated zero. Only by returning these
two scores to their original metric and recomputing the molar
difference score were we able to explore whether the White or
Black experimenter was perceived as receiving better treatment
from the participants. We found that, on average, the judges
assigned more favorable molar judgment ratings to the interactions
with the Black experimenter than to that with the White experi-
menter (M  3.80 vs. M  2.94, respectively). This difference was
statistically significant, t(40)  4.28, p  .001, p
2  .31.
When one examines the untransformed data, it appears that
those with higher IAT scores were the least behaviorally biased in
the sample. As IAT scores increased, the tendency to behave in a
biased way (against Whites relative to Blacks) decreased. This
trend can be seen by regressing the unstandardized molar judgment
difference scores onto the IAT score, as shown in Figure 2. This
graph estimates differences in the molar treatment of the White
versus the Black experimenter for individuals ranging from 2
standard deviations above and below the mean IAT score (M 
0.18, SD  0.13). Negative molar difference scores indicate a
tendency to act more positively toward the Black rather than White
experimenter.
As Figure 2 shows, individuals tended to be most biased behav-
iorally against Whites across most of the IAT distribution. Partic-
ipants at the high end of the IAT distribution showed little or no
racial bias (i.e., difference scores near zero). Thus, it is not accu-
rate to say that high IAT scores predicted discrimination against
the Black experimenter. Instead, high IAT scores appear to have
predicted more egalitarian behavior toward both the Black and
White experimenters, and lower scores appear to have predicted
more discrimination toward the White experimenter. There is thus
a disconnect between the attitudinal and behavioral data, and the
usual interpretation given to the McConnell and Leibold (2001)
study as showing that the IAT predicts discrimination against
Blacks is dubious.9
McConnell and Leibold (2001) provided no rationale for stan-
dardizing the molar ratings, which does not appear to be standard
practice within similar interaction studies (see, e.g., Bargh, Chen,
& Burrows, 1996; Heider & Skowronski, 2007; Richeson & Shel-
ton, 2005; Shelton et al., 2005), and we see no rationale for doing
so given that the interest was in the relationship between IAT
scores and observed behavior of individuals across the spectrum of
8 Table 3 in McConnell and Leibold (2001) reported a correlation of r 
.34 rather than the r  .32 that our reanalysis yielded. Both correlations
were significant at the .05 level before elimination of the outlier. We could
replicate the correlation reported in Table 3 using the IATFULL variable
from the McConnell and Leibold database, but we could not replicate the
IAT effect correlations reported in Table 2 of McConnell and Leibold
using the IATFULL variable. However, we were able to replicate the
results reported in Table 2 using the IATTRIM variable from McConnell
and Leibold’s database. (The IATFULL variable included Blocks 3 and 4
vs. Blocks 6 and 7 from the IAT session, whereas the IATTRIM variable
drops Blocks 3 and 6 but keeps Blocks 4 and 7. The differences in results
produced by the variables were small.) We focused our reanalyses on the
IATTRIM variable that was used to report the IAT effect.
9 For example, Chugh (2004, p. 211) read McConnell and Leibold
(2001) as showing an “implicit bias favoring Whites” in participants’
nonverbal behaviors. Chugh’s reading is perfectly reasonable given that
McConnell and Leibold reported that “as participants’ IAT scores reflected
relatively more positive attitudes toward Whites than Blacks, social inter-
actions were more positive toward the White experimenter than the Black
experimenter as assessed by both trained judges and by the experimenters
themselves (p. 439).” Although it would not salvage the result as reported
by McConnell and Leibold, one could argue that the IAT is still predictive
of discriminatory behavior against Blacks, because, even though the Black
experimenter was treated more positively than the White experimenter for
most individuals, those with a lower IAT score tended to behave even more
positively toward the Black experimenter relative to the White experi-
menter. Of course, such a finding hardly indicates that the IAT predicts
discriminatory behavior against minorities, which, at a minimum, would
require that a White person be treated more favorably than a Black person.
It is possible that the Black experimenter was more likable than the White
experimenter and that those with low IAT scores were more open to liking
the Black experimenter than those with higher IAT scores. But presumably
McConnell and Leibold controlled for relative likeability of the experi-
menters. If not, then this uncontrolled variable confounds the interpretation
of McConnell and Leibold’s findings. It also is quite possible that the
computed difference score for both the judges’ ratings and the IAT differ-
ence score have arbitrary zero points, such that neither value should be
used to estimate the degree of anti-Black bias in the sample. At a minimum,
however, problems with the judges’ ratings point to the need for caution in
interpretation.
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behaviors as defined by the rating measures (which McConnell
and Leibold treated as meaningful measures of interaction quality)
rather than the behavior of individuals relative to the mean level of
discrimination within a sample.10 Indeed, using this approach
effectively ensures relative differences in behavior that may appear
equally discriminatory despite the actual nature of, and differences
in, the interactions.
In any event, the key point is that the standardization of judges’
ratings obscured the nature of participants’ behavioral preferences
as originally rated by the judges, which might cause readers to
draw inaccurate conclusions: that the study documented disparate
treatment of Blacks relative to Whites (e.g., Kang, 2005, p. 1514)
and that the IAT predicted behavioral tendencies that will likely
“disadvantage Black job applicants” (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006,
p. 962). Such inferences do not appear warranted. Moreover, by
focusing readers’ attention only on the tendency for 90% of the
sample to show IAT scores that IAT researchers traditionally
interpret as indicative of an anti-Black implicit bias and by not at
the same time reporting the corresponding tendency for 70% of the
sample to act more positively towards the Black experimenter than
the White experimenter, the published report could give readers
the mistaken impression that the distribution of IAT scores in the
study correctly characterized the behavioral tendencies of the
study sample. Such was not the case.
Reanalysis 4: The Predictive Utility of an IAT Score
Following Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006) call for indexing the
IAT metric to observed behaviors to make the IAT metric less
arbitrary, one may ask whether knowing a person’s race IAT score
allows one to forecast with any degree of precision how that
10 A reviewer raised the possibility that McConnell and Leibold (2001)
standardized the judges’ ratings to control for a lack of equivalence in the
interactions with experimenters (i.e., the White experimenter asked fewer
scripted questions, and presumably interacted less with the participant, than
did the Black experimenter). Although these differences may well have
affected the dependent variables that involved behavioral counts (e.g.,
number of smiles and speech errors by participants during their interac-
tions), these differences should not have affected the molar judgment
ratings, which were supposed to be ratings of overall interaction quality.
Even if we assume the molar judgments were biased by the differences in
interaction content and duration, the standardization approach taken by
McConnell and Leibold—standardizing molar judgments of interactions
with the White experimenter, standardizing molar judgments of interac-
tions with the Black experimenter, and then computing difference scores
from these two standardized scores—could not correct any bias in the
difference score. This is because McConnell and Leibold’s approach
merely put each separate interaction score onto its own standardized metric
(each with a mean of zero). This method guarantees that the two interac-
tions will be rated as equivalent by the sample of judges.
Figure 1. Scatter plot of unstandardardized molar judgment ratings and Implicit Association Test (IAT) scores
from McConnell and Leibold (2001). The y-axis (behavior) refers to the difference in overall interaction quality
for treatment of the White versus Black experimenter as measured by unstandardized molar judgments. A
positive score represents more positive interaction with the White than Black experimenter (as rated by
independent judges). Positive IAT scores reflect greater relative negativity toward Blacks.
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person will act in the presence of African Americans. Analysis of
McConnell and Leibold’s (2001) individual-level data sheds light
on this question, as well as on the question of whether IAT
researchers should give individual test takers feedback that labels
them racially biased. Consider that one of the participants in this
study had an IAT score of 0.27 and a molar rating of 0.83. This
means that this individuals’ behavior tended to be 0.83 of a unit
more positive toward the White experimenter than the Black
experimenter. Another individual also had an IAT score of 0.27,
and this individual’s molar behavior score was –1.00. This means
that the latter individual’s behavior tended to be one unit more
negative toward the White experimenter than the Black experi-
menter. Although these two individuals had identical IAT scores
suggesting implicit bias against Blacks, their discriminatory be-
havior was in opposite directions.
We can more formally examine the predictive utility of the IAT
at the individual level using prediction intervals derived from IAT
scores (prediction intervals take into account, among other things,
the amount of unexplained variance in the criterion, the number of
predictors, and the overall sample size; for elaboration, see Neter,
Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). We calculated the 95%
prediction interval for a participant with an IAT score of 0.21 and
found an interval ranging from –3.3 to 1.8, which means that we
can be 95% confident that an individual with an IAT score of 0.21
will have a molar rating score somewhere between –3.3 and 1.8.11
This wide prediction interval is to be expected given that 90% of
the variation in behavior has nothing to do with the IAT (1 – r2 
.90). Note also that the prediction interval contains the value of
zero (the value that supposedly indicates identical treatment of the
Black and White experimenter). We thus cannot say with any
confidence whether a person with an IAT score of 0.21 would
discriminate against Blacks, Whites, or neither given this predic-
tion interval spanning negative to positive numbers.
The same result holds for all IAT scores in McConnell and
Leibold’s (2001) study. We calculated 95% prediction intervals for
the value of every individual within the McConnell and Leibold
study, and in each case the interval spanned zero. For example, for
the highest IAT score observed (0.53), the 95% prediction interval
was –2.6 to 2.9 and, for the lowest observed IAT score (–0.15), the
prediction interval was –4.6 to 0.9. If we lower our confidence
interval to 80%, the prediction intervals still span zero for the IAT
scores of 40 of the 41 individuals in McConnell and Leibold’s
study. The one exception was the case of an IAT score of –0.15,
obtained by the participant anchoring the lower quadrant of Fig-
11 This is an informal characterization of the prediction interval. As with
all confidence intervals, the strict interpretation is in terms of the true
population value being contained within the calculated interval across an
infinite number of replications of the experiment.
Figure 2. Scatter plot of unstandardized molar judgment ratings and Implicit Association Test (IAT) scores
with predicted values (sloped line) and sample mean (flat line) from McConnell and Leibold (2001). The y-axis
(behavior) refers to the difference in overall interaction quality for treatment of the White versus Black
experimenter as measured by unstandardized molar judgments. A positive score represents more positive
interaction with the White than Black experimenter (as rated by independent judges). Positive IAT scores reflect
greater relative negativity toward Blacks.
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ure 1, about whom we can say with 80% confidence that she will
behave more positively toward Blacks than Whites, albeit only in
a setting with the characteristics of the McConnell and Leibold
study.
Reanalysis 5: Predicting Behavior With and Without
the IAT
Yet another perspective on the predictive utility of the IAT can
be gained by considering its standard error of estimate. If the IAT
is an individual-difference measure of implicit prejudice and a
related propensity to discriminate, then high IAT scorers should
discriminate more against Blacks than do low scorers. One way to
test whether this relationship holds, and with what degree of
precision, is to examine the level of discrimination predicted by
IAT scores and the level of discrimination that actually occurred
within a sample. This comparison can be obtained by using linear
regression to generate predicted discrimination scores for partici-
pants based on IAT scores and comparing the predicted to the
actual discrimination score for each participant.
The full range of observed IAT scores is shown on the x-axis of
Figure 2, with molar ratings of the relative quality of experimenter
interactions along the y-axis. This scatter plot replicates that in
Figure 1 but adds a regression line predicting the behavior of
participants from IAT scores and a line reflecting the sample mean.
Although the sloped regression line captures the general trend
suggested by the data (when outliers are included in the analysis),
it is generally a poor predictor of behavior. Consider as just one
example the lowest IAT scorer within the sample. For this indi-
vidual, the IAT’s prediction was off by 2.16 units (actual molar
rating of –4.00 compared to predicted molar rating of –1.84).
If discrepancy scores are computed for all participants, one can
calculate the average discrepancy between predicted and observed
scores (or one can use instead the standard error of the estimate,
which is analogous to this average discrepancy score and which we
use here). For the McConnell and Leibold (2001) data, the average
discrepancy was 1.24 units. Thus, if one were to use the IAT to
predict a given participant’s behavior, estimates would tend to be
wrong by about 1.25 points on the behavior metric (which had a
possible range of –8 to 8 but an actual range for this sample of
–4.00 to 1.6). In comparison, if one simply predicts that each
person will show a level of bias equal to the average bias in the
sample, one does almost as well at predicting behavior. In the
McConnell and Leibold study, participants on average favored
the Black participant by 0.86 units (M  –0.86) according to the
judges’ observations, and using this mean score to predict behavior
for every participants leads to an average discrepancy of 1.32
units.
Thus, a model with no predictors performed just 0.08 behavioral
scale units worse than the model with the IAT as a predictor. This
0.08-unit improvement occurs for a criterion with an 18-point
range (and a functional 8-point range in the current study), mean-
ing that the IAT improved prediction by less than half of 1% of the
possible range of scores. One could achieve virtually the same
level of predictive accuracy achieved with the IAT as a predictor,
and save the resources associated with administering and scoring
the IAT, by assuming that everyone in the study will exhibit an
average level of discrimination. This finding corroborates the
prediction interval finding: McConnell and Leibold’s (2001) data
do not present a strong case for the predictive utility of the IAT.
Reanalysis of the Ziegert and Hanges (2005) Study
Description of the Study
Overview. Ziegert and Hanges (2005) sought to test whether
“implicit racist attitudes interacted with a climate for racial bias to
predict discrimination” (p. 553). They predicted that higher levels
of implicit racism would result in discrimination against Blacks
only in a climate that tolerates discrimination. Thus, they did not
propose as strong a role for implicit racism as did McConnell and
Leibold. Whereas McConnell and Leibold argued that IAT scores
would predict racial preference even in the absence of any prompt-
ing, Ziegert and Hanges argued that a climate for bias was neces-
sary for implicit prejudice to translate into discrimination (and
compare Vanman et al., 2004, which found no relation between
IAT scores and judgments about candidates for a teaching fellow-
ship but did find a relation between these judgments and activity of
muscles used in facial expressions as measured by electromyogra-
phy).
Procedure. Ziegert and Hanges replicated the procedure used
by Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, and Vaslow (2000), but they sup-
plemented the design with an implicit measure of racial prejudice
in the form of the race IAT. One hundred and three non-Black
participants played the role of a manager who was given the task
of evaluating eight job applicants in a hypothetical company for an
open vice president position. The managers made their candidate
evaluations on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (should not have
been referred) to 5 (excellent referral).12 Dossiers for the hypo-
thetical job candidates provided information about each candidate,
including race information, with three candidates being Black and
three White. Ziegert and Hanges used an outcome variable equiv-
alent to the mean of the ratings for the three Black applicants
minus the mean of the ratings for the three White applicants.
Ziegert and Hanges (2005) manipulated the conditions under
which participants acting as managers rated the applicants. Half of
the participants were randomly assigned to the climate for equality
condition, in which they received a memo from the hypothetical
president of the company indicating that candidates should be
evaluated on the basis of their education and experience. The other
half of the participants were assigned to the climate for racial bias
condition, in which participants were informed that candidates
should be evaluated on the basis of their education and experience
but also were told
Given that the vast majority of our workforce is White, it is essential
we put a White person in the [vice president] position. I do not want
to jeopardize the fine relationship we have with our people in the
units. Betty (the outgoing vice president) worked long and hard to get
those folks to trust us, and I do not want her replacement to have to
overcome any personal barriers.
12 Ziegert and Hanges (2005) collected data on 103 participants, but 6
participants had missing values on one or more of the main variables.
These participants were excluded from Ziegert and Hanges’s analyses and
ours as well, to maintain consistency between the data sets, with a resulting
sample size of 97.
576 BLANTON ET AL.
After completing the candidate evaluations, participants com-
pleted the race IAT, which served as the implicit measure of
prejudice. Participants had previously completed explicit measures
of prejudice as part of a mass testing packet completed by intro-
ductory psychology students.
Reported results. Ziegert and Hanges (2005) found that scores
on the race IAT, but not scores on the explicit prejudice measures,
correlated significantly with candidate ratings in the climate for
racial bias condition, with higher IAT scores associated with more
negative ratings of Black relative to White candidates. Ziegert and
Hanges found no such association in the climate for equality
condition. The interaction contrast comparing regression coeffi-
cients in the two conditions using the IAT score as a predictor of
candidate evaluations was statistically significant. This finding
supported Ziegert and Hanges’s hypothesis that the impact of
implicit prejudice would be detectable in the climate for racial bias
but not in the climate for equality.
Methodological Comments
Three aspects of Ziegert and Hanges’s (2005) methodology
limit the generality of their finding.
Experimental manipulation. The instructional set in the cli-
mate for racial bias, as presented above, was blatantly racist and
was delivered in a hypothetical, role-playing setting. Thus, one
may question the ability of this study to speak to the everyday
relationship between implicit prejudice and discriminatory behav-
ior. Kang and Banaji (2006) acknowledged that the manipulation
used by Ziegert and Hanges (2005) “seems unrealistic because
such preferences are no longer written down” (p. 1063), but they
argued that this artificiality was a strength of the study because
“the outlandishness of the request should have worked against
finding any behavioral correlation” (p. 1063). Of course, one could
just as easily argue that this artificiality is a weakness because the
heavy-handedness of the request created demand characteristics
(Gaes, Kalle, & Tedeschi, 1978; Orne, 1962).
Applicant equivalence. Ziegert and Hanges (2005) did not test
whether their participant population considered their six hypothet-
ical candidates to have equivalent qualifications before assigning
race to the candidates. Instead, it was assumed that Brief, Buttram,
Elliott, Reisenstein, and McCline’s (1995) pretesting of these
materials with another sample and the random assignment of race
and sex to the hypothetical candidates sufficed to equalize the
candidates. That left open the possibility that the three applicants
labeled Black were perceived as less qualified than those labeled
White. Ziegert and Hanges stated that all six candidates were
constructed to have “outstanding qualifications” and that “prior
work has shown that there are no differences among these six
candidates when race information is removed” (p. 556), but an
examination of ratings of the candidates by Ziegert and Hanges’s
participants does not support this conclusion.
If the six candidates were equally qualified, one would expect
no significant differences in the evaluations of these candidates
holding race constant. However, there were significant differences
in how the Black candidates were rated, F(2, 96)  31.08, p 
.001, such that one Black candidate was rated significantly higher
(M  4.18, SD  0.87) than the other two (M  3.53, SD  0.98
vs. M  3.52, SD  0.90), t(96)  7.86, p  .001, 2  .15. There
were similar differences among the White applicants, F(2, 93) 
14.93, p  .001, such that one White applicant received signifi-
cantly higher ratings (M  4.60, SD  0.62) than the other two
(M  4.19, SD  0.82 vs. M  4.16, SD  0.76), t(96)  5.44,
p  .001, 2  .24. These findings contradict the assertion that,
but for race, the applicant profiles were comparable. Although it is
possible that qualification differences within the two groups of
candidates canceled out one another across the two groups and
across experimental conditions, these differences confound inter-
pretations of Ziegert and Hanges’s (2005) data as showing that
implicit bias drove differences in candidate ratings within the
climate for racial bias.
Scoring the IAT. Ziegert and Hanges (2005) scored the IAT in
a way that, to our knowledge, has never been used in another
published study. They recorded response latencies for the two IAT
tasks (typically referred to as the compatible and incompatible
tasks) and recorded the error rates for these two tasks (i.e., how
often individuals made classification errors). They then standard-
ized both the reaction time scores and the error scores and aver-
aged these two indices together, before computing the IAT differ-
ence score. They did not transform their reaction times using
standard methods to address known IAT confounds (see Green-
wald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), nor did they report the correlation
between latencies and error scores. Since there are no published
psychometric analyses of the reliability or validity of Ziegert and
Hanges’s unique scoring procedure, one cannot assume that the
same IAT scores or overall results would have been obtained if a
traditional IAT scoring algorithm had been used. Ziegert and
Hanges’s unique scoring method also puts the IAT on a new
metric, which prevented us from investigating zero-point implica-
tions for attitudinal versus behavioral bias, as we did in the
McConnell and Leibold (2001) study.13
Reanalysis 1: Replication of Results and the
Influence of Outliers
Ziegert and Hanges (2005) used hierarchical linear modeling to
test the hypothesized interaction between context and the IAT as a
predictor of applicant evaluations and reported that the interaction
was statistically significant ( p  .05). In our reanalysis, we could
not replicate this interaction effect using traditional standard errors
( p  .07) or robust standard errors ( p  .06), but Ziegert and
Hanges did not provide details of their analytic strategy and thus it
is possible our parameterization differed from theirs. Nevertheless,
this difference in the results, though not large, does suggest a
13 The unavailability of the raw IAT data in the Ziegert and Hanges
(2005) study creates a problem for investigators who seek a deeper under-
standing of the individual-difference variables that might be assessed by as
complex an assessment tool as the IAT. Consider, for instance, the possible
predictive power not of the compatible-and-incompatible-trial, response-
time differentials but of the response-time differentials that arise within the
compatible and incompatible trials—and that serve as the denominator
term in the latest IAT scoring algorithm. Because Ziegert and Hanges could
not provide us with this information, we could not test the plausible
alternative hypothesis that high IAT scorers were simply those with faster
general reaction times—perhaps because they were simply more attentive
or alert test takers who were also more attentive to the demand-
characteristic cues linked to the racist–organizational climate manipula-
tion.
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fragility in Ziegert and Hanges’s key finding from the perspective
of traditional alpha levels.
We examined the scatter plots for the IAT–applicant evaluation
relationship for each of the separate conditions to determine visu-
ally if there were apparent outliers whose presence might have
influenced the trend of the data within conditions. As shown in
Figure 3, the plots for the two groups look similar except for three
outliers at the top of the scatter plot for the racial bias climate
condition. Removal of these individuals from the model yielded
interaction contrast p values of .252 for the traditional standard
error analysis and .155 for the robust standard error analysis. More
importantly, application of an outlier-resistant method for compar-
ing regression lines in two groups, based on Theil-Senn regression
methods (see Wilcox, 2005), produced a statistically nonsignifi-
cant interaction contrast ( p  .13).
We also analyzed the simple slopes within each condition.
These tests were not reported by Ziegert and Hanges (2005), but
they presented a figure showing the two relevant regression lines.
Using the same behavioral criterion and analytic strategy of Zieg-
ert and Hanges but applying them separately to the conditions, we
found that the slope in the climate for equality condition was
statistically nonsignificant (unstandardized regression coeffi-
cient  0.03, ns), but the slope in the climate for racial bias
condition was statistically significant in the predicted direction
(unstandardized regression coefficient  –0.20, t[44]  2.49, p 
.05). Furthermore, the percentage bend correlation between IAT
scores and relative candidate evaluations in the climate for racial
bias remained statistically significant (absolute rpb  .38, p  .02),
indicating that outliers did not affect this result. Thus, if one
focuses on the IAT–judgment correlations within each condition,
Ziegert and Hanges’s finding is resistant to the influence of out-
liers.
Reanalysis 2: Decomposing Effects for White Versus
Black Applicants
As with the reanalysis of McConnell and Leibold’s (2001) data,
we sought to decompose the effects of implicit prejudice to deter-
mine whether the tendency for the IAT to predict racial prefer-
ences was evident for both White and Black candidates considered
separately. Table 4 presents the results of regression analyses
predicting the evaluation of each applicant using the IAT as a
predictor. The IAT was a statistically significant predictor in 2 of
the 12 regression analyses that correspond to ratings of two of the
three Black applicants in the racial-bias climate. This finding
supports Ziegert and Hanges’s (2005) predictions, in that the IAT
predicted bias with respect to the treatment of two of the three
Black applicants in the climate for racial bias condition.
Reanalysis 3: The IAT as a Diagnostic Tool: Prediction
Intervals and the Standard Error of Estimate
As with the McConnell and Leibold (2001) study, we calculated
how well one could predict discriminatory evaluations using 95%
prediction intervals, focusing on individuals in the racially biased
context because this was the only condition in which the IAT had
predictive utility.14 We calculated prediction intervals for every
individual based on each one’s IAT score and, as in the McConnell
and Leibold study, the interval spanned negative to positive values
and included the value of zero for every participant. For example,
for the highest IAT score observed (4.30), the 95% prediction
interval was –0.2 to 3.7, and for the lowest observed IAT value
(–3.90), the prediction interval was –4.6 to 0.9. These data suggest
the predictive utility of the IAT is limited even when individuals
are directed to discriminate.
To compare the model that included the IAT with a model that
had no predictors, we calculated the standard error of estimate for
the IAT for only individuals in the racially biased context, which
yielded an average error in prediction of 0.76. For the no-predictor
model, the corresponding error rate was 0.78. Thus, the IAT
reduced error by only 0.02 units on a scale that could range from
–4.00 to 4.00 (and did range from –1.00 to 4.00). This small
degree of error reduction is not surprising given that almost 95%
of the variance in the behavioral measure was due to factors not
measured by the IAT.
Discussion
Our reanalysis of two key studies on the IAT–behavior linkage
failed to find a robust relationship between IAT scores and dis-
criminatory behavior. The result that Ziegert and Hanges (2005)
reported for the interactive effect of implicit prejudice and racist
climate on discriminatory behavior was not robust to the influence
of outliers or to specification changes in the regression analysis,
but when we examined IAT–behavior correlations within each
climate condition, Ziegert and Hanges’s finding was resistant to
the influence of outliers. We also found that the IAT is not
informative as a diagnostic tool in the way that would be most
natural in legal settings because no individual’s discriminatory
behavior could be reliably predicted from his or her IAT score.
Given the unique methods employed in Ziegert and Hanges and
the limited predictive validity of the IAT, the results of Ziegert and
Hanges do not suggest a robust relationship between implicit bias,
as measured by the race IAT, and discriminatory ratings of Black
candidates.
Many interactions in social science turn out to depend on the
power of independent variables to move small numbers of respon-
dents to polarized locations on dependent measures. Thus, the
conditionality of Ziegert and Hanges’s results on extreme scorers
in an artificial climate is not inherently troubling from a theoretical
perspective. However, from an applied perspective, the Ziegert and
Hanges data provide little support to those who assert broadly that
the typical distribution of IAT scores shows a robust tendency for
most people in most groups to favor Whites relative to Blacks or
that IAT scores are good or reliable predictors of discrimination
against protected groups (e.g., Kang, 2005). The IAT, as uniquely
scored by Ziegert and Hanges, added very little predictive power
14 We performed this analysis using traditional ordinary least squares
regression where the dependent variable was defined as the difference
between the mean evaluation of the White applicants minus the mean
evaluation of the Black applicants. This is equivalent to the hierarchical
linear modeling approach used by Ziegert and Hanges (2005), except the
repeated measure factor of race of the applicant is treated as a fixed effect
rather than a random effect. The fixed effect analysis yields lower standard
errors and more narrow confidence intervals than the random effects
approach, so our analyses make it more likely the prediction intervals will
not contain the value of zero.
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beyond that of a simple base rate model and could not delimit the
range of likely discrimination in any meaningful way.
The results of our reanalysis of the McConnell and Leibold
(2001) data were more far reaching than the results of our reanal-
ysis of the Ziegert and Hanges (2005) data (and more significant
given the prominence of McConnell and Leibold as a source of
support for the claim that the IAT predicts discriminatory behav-
ior, even outside of the kind of racist climate studied by Ziegert
and Hanges). Although we could replicate (roughly) the basic
finding from Ziegert and Hanges, we found their result to be
fragile. When we unpacked the McConnell and Leibold data, we
could not validate a basic conclusion often drawn from McConnell
and Leibold’s study: that judges observed greater discrimination
toward the Black experimenter by White participants who were
scored as more implicitly biased on the IAT. A data transformation
by McConnell and Leibold obscured the nature of the judges’
ratings. The untransformed data suggested that participants acted
more positively toward the Black experimenter than the White
experimenter and, importantly, that higher race IAT scores (which
are commonly interpreted as reflecting higher levels of implicit
prejudice against Blacks) were actually linked to pro-Black rather
than to anti-Black behavior. In addition, the McConnell and Lei-
bold data exhibited instability in that (a) deletion of as few as one
outlier from the statistical tests altered the reported significance
levels and (b) the judges relied on by McConnell and Leibold
reached different conclusions about the nature of the participant–
experimenter interactions, leading to poor interjudge agreement
and to one judge’s ratings of participants’ interactions with the
White experimenter having excessive influence on the results.
We only made these discoveries by asking whether it was
appropriate to aggregate these data in light of the low interjudge
reliabilities in McConnell and Leibold (2001) and then examining
the judges’ raw ratings from McConnell and Leibold. The most
common justification for aggregation occurs in a psychometric
context where one attempts to increase the reliability of a measure
of a construct by summing (or averaging) scores across items
(from either self-reports or from observer reports). If the items all
reflect the same construct to the same degree, then averaging
causes random noise across items to cancel out, yielding a more
reliable total index (see, e.g., Cronbach, Rajaratnam, & Gleser,
1963). Summation is problematic, however, if the items reflect
different constructs. As noted by Carver (1989), analyses of com-
Figure 3. Scatter plot of candidate evaluations from separate evaluation climates in Ziegert and Hanges (2005).
IAT  Implicit Association Test.
Table 4
Regression Analyses for Individual Applicants’ Evaluations as a
Function of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) From Ziegert
and Hanges (2005)
Applicant evaluated B for IAT R2
Equality condition
White applicants
Applicant 1 .008 .001
Applicant 2 –.063 .016
Applicant 3 .014 .001
Black applicants
Applicant 1 .006 .001
Applicant 2 .085 .025
Applicant 3 .056 .015
Racial bias condition
White applicants
Applicant 1 .011 .001
Applicant 2 .025 .003
Applicant 3 .051 .017
Black applicants
Applicant 1 .194 .089
Applicant 2 .195† .079
Applicant 3 .264 .149
Note. B  unstandardized regression coefficient.
 p  .05. † p  .10.
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binations of distinct components may cause one to infer incorrectly
that effects on the aggregate replicate across the distinct compo-
nents. If in an observational study a result on an aggregate is driven
by a single judge, then that calls into question the generalizability
of the effect and the wisdom of aggregating across judges. Indeed,
if an effect occurs for some but not the majority of stimuli, or for
some but not the majority of behaviors, it is possible the observed
effect reflects little more than a chance result.
Although we have subjected the McConnell and Leibold (2001)
and Ziegert and Hanges (2005) studies to considerable scrutiny,
our concern is not the defensibility of the claims made by those
specific researchers or of their methods and data-analytic tech-
niques in a general sense. Indeed, those researchers should be
commended for engaging in the scientific process by sharing their
data and submitting their studies to heightened scrutiny. For a
number of studies, data were not retained for relatively short time
periods, not to mention for the 5 years required under American
Psychological Association standards and editorial policies. Thus,
arguably our most disconcerting finding was corroboration of a
point made by Wicherts, Borsboom, Katz, and Molenaar (2006):
Social psychologists are doing a poor job complying with the
scientific norm of replication.
Our primary concern is, however, with the way a small number
of studies are being used to make strong claims in applied settings,
including courtrooms (see Feuss & Sosna, 2007). Although one
might quibble over a particular reanalysis or the implications of a
specific outlier, the broad picture that emerges from our reanalysis
is that the published results are likely to be conditional and fragile
and do not permit broad conclusions about the prevalence of
discriminatory tendencies in American society. Given the paucity
of studies showing strong links between IAT scores and behavior,
given our inability to gain access to published data sets, and given
the weakness of the data that we did obtain, psychologists and
legal scholars do not have evidentiary warrant to claim that the
race IAT can accurately or reliably diagnose anyone’s likelihood
of engaging in discriminatory behavior, less still that there is
substantial evidence of such linkages (contra Greenwald &
Krieger, 2006).
Of course, the facts may change. Indeed, we hope that our
reanalyses of the McConnell and Leibold (2001) and Ziegert and
Hanges (2005) studies will prompt efforts to show that the IAT
predicts discriminatory behavior in both nonverbal and macrolevel
behaviors and to examine more carefully the IAT metric so that
researchers might get a better sense of which scores—if any—
typically and reliably are indicative of anti-Black bias. For we
agree with McConnell and Leibold that, at least in the domain of
social psychology, “any psychological tool is only as good as its
ability to predict human behavior” (p. 440). However, if the results
of McConnell and Leibold and Ziegert and Hanges turn out to be
representative of the (weak and qualified) relationship that exists
between race IAT scores and criterion behaviors and if future
demonstrations are restricted to controlled and contrived labora-
tory settings, then claims about behavioral implications of implicit
prejudice should reflect the modesty of the record.15
Our reanalyses suggest some directions for future studies on the
relation of IAT scores to discriminatory behavior. First, research-
ers should make greater use of robust statistical techniques to
guard against the influence of outliers (Wilcox, 2005). In each of
the studies considered here, robust analyses and scatter plots raised
concerns about the replicability and generality of the results.
Second, researchers should move beyond simple zero-order
correlational tests of (implicit) attitude–behavior relations. We
pursued one strategy—based on data disaggregation—for under-
standing these relations, but the disaggregation strategy should be
taken much further. For instance, we have noted elsewhere that the
IAT is a limited tool for testing psychological theories because
researchers typically use the composite IAT score to predict com-
posite discrimination criteria. Consider that the IAT used in both of
the studies we examined focused on a single IAT score that was
influenced by the tendency to associate (a) Whites with positive
concepts, (b) Whites with negative concepts, (c) Blacks with
positive concepts, and (d) Blacks with negative concepts. Re-
searchers in both studies then used this composite score to predict
criteria that were themselves composite indicators of (a) evalua-
tions of Black people and (b) evaluations of White people. These
were computed as difference scores, which are notoriously mis-
leading (Edwards, 2001). Many distinct psychological trends thus
could have been driving the patterns McConnell and Leibold
(2001) and Ziegert and Hanges (2005) documented but nonethe-
less led to the appearance of comparable influences at the level of
the aggregate.
Third, researchers should examine the role of implicit attitudes
after controlling for relevant explicitly measured beliefs and atti-
tudes. Most studies investigating an IAT’s predictive validity focus
simply on zero-order relations between IAT scores and criteria,
with no controls for explicit evaluations or constructs (see Green-
wald et al., in press). One positive feature of McConnell and
Leibold’s (2001) study was that these researchers did collect
explicit attitude data and controlled for these attitudes in some of
their analyses. However, their explicit measures were brief and
unusually crude for an investigation that sought to predict a com-
plex behavior pattern. This approach to explicit measures is typical
of IAT research. Studies that focus attention on the IAT often
assess explicit attitudes using a few distal evaluations. Typical
measures include broad semantic differentials (e.g., rating Blacks
on the pleasant–unpleasant dimension) and feeling thermometers
(see Greenwald et al., in press, for other examples). Researchers
have long known that such measures are poor predictors of specific
behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) and represent outdated and
long-ago rejected representations of viable attitude–behavior mod-
els. Reliance on such explicit measures can thus lead to inflated
estimates of the importance of implicit constructs if there is a
mismatch between the types of attitudes assessed and types of
behaviors examined (Jaccard & Blanton, 2006). In other applied
domains, such as in health psychology, researchers who try to
advance new attitudinal constructs typically are held to the stan-
dard of showing improved criterion prediction after known deter-
15 We believe that the ideal solution to the implicit bias debates will take
the form of adversarial collaborations that require both proponents and
skeptics to agree on research designs for testing the rival predictions about
the pervasiveness and potency of unconscious prejudice under various
well-defined boundary conditions (Greenwald, 2004; Mellers, Hertwig, &
Kahneman, 2001; Tetlock & Mitchell, in press). Nonetheless, replication
studies are an important part of the scientific process (e.g., King, 1995) and
providing a critique with data reanalysis is much more informative than
one without such reanalysis.
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minants of behavior—properly measured and conceptualized—
have been controlled (e.g., using constructs from the theory of
reasoned action and planned behavior; Ajzen, 1991). Until inves-
tigations of this type are performed, we think it premature to argue
that a new form of attitude is being observed, one that cannot be
assessed using traditional measurement techniques and that policy
makers and other practitioners must grapple with (e.g., Kang &
Banaji, 2006).
Finally, even if future IAT studies reveal robust criterion–
prediction relations after researchers control for explicit attitudes
and beliefs, it will be critical for researchers to develop meaningful
external criteria that can be used to validate the labels given to IAT
respondents and the strong inferences made in the applied litera-
ture about the meaning of locations on the IAT metric. A simpli-
fying assumption, embraced widely in the IAT literature, is that the
IAT distribution corresponds to the distribution of people’s true
implicit attitudes (Banaji et al., 2004). Thus, respondents with
positive race IAT scores are viewed as biased in one direction (anti-
Black), respondents with negative IAT scores are viewed as biased in
another (anti-White), and respondents with IAT scores near zero
are viewed as nonbiased. However, no research has validated the
zero point of the race IAT, and our reanalyses showed that one
might make a great number of errors if one tries to make even
directional predictions about behavior from someone’s race IAT
score, much less precise estimates of the amount of racial discrim-
ination an individual’s IAT score implies.
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